Saint Louis University Law Journal
Volume 53
Number 1 The Use and Misuse of History in
U.S. Foreign Relations Law (Fall 2008)

Article 13

2008

Affecting Foreign Affairs Is Not the Same as Making Foreign
Policy: A Comment on Judicial Foreign Policy
A. Mark Weisburd
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, amw@email.unc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
A. M. Weisburd, Affecting Foreign Affairs Is Not the Same as Making Foreign Policy: A Comment on
Judicial Foreign Policy, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. (2008).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol53/iss1/13

This Response is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

AFFECTING FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS NOT THE SAME AS MAKING
FOREIGN POLICY: A COMMENT ON JUDICIAL FOREIGN POLICY

A. MARK WEISBURD*

INTRODUCTION
Professor David Sloss’s Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s1
is a fascinating and provocative account of a crucial series of events from the
earliest days of the government established by the Constitution. As I will note
below, his narrative shows some of the growing pains of the federal
government. I have some quibbles about his evaluation of the British
“lawfare” policy and his suggestion that judicial application of prize law in the
eighteenth century is a significant precedent for the use of international law as
a generator of rules of decision in the twenty-first. However, my comments
will focus mainly on what I take to be the most important inference he draws
from the events he recounts: that judicial minimalism in foreign affairs is
inconsistent with the Framers’ understanding of the Constitution, given that,
during the period he describes, the federal Executive concluded that the
judiciary was the department of the federal government best equipped to
address privateering questions with significant foreign relations implications.2
I. A SNAPSHOT OF THE FOUNDING ERA
Professor Sloss’s paper offers an opportunity to reflect on the way the
founding generation understood—or came to understand—the scheme of
government established by the Constitution. In the first place, his narrative
provides a fair degree of ammunition for those who doubt the utility of
originalism as an infallible method of constitutional interpretation. As he
makes clear, when French privateers started making illegal captures in 1793,
no official was certain which branch of the federal government should address
the problem.3 The first case raising this matter was treated as an executive

* Martha M. Brandis Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
1. David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 145
(2008).
2. Id. at 194–96.
3. Id. at 152–54.
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matter and resolved by Attorney General Edmund Randolph; subsequently,
however, the Washington administration decided that dealing with such cases
was a judicial function.4 This uncertainty is especially striking because both
President Washington and Attorney General Randolph were delegates to the
Constitutional Convention5 and Randolph was one of the members of the
committee that produced a first draft of the Constitution.6 That is, even when
the President and the Attorney General were themselves among the Framers,
they proceeded under the assumption that the Constitution was unclear on this
jurisdictional issue and determined how to resolve it on the basis of practical
considerations as they revealed themselves.
The situation Professor Sloss addresses also provides a glimpse of the early
functioning of the federal judiciary. For one thing, it makes clear that twentyfirst century ideas of the necessity of sharp limits between the Executive and
Judicial Branches had not yet taken hold;7 it is quite striking that two treaties
very relevant to the events of this period—the Jay Treaty of 1794 and the
Convention of 1800 ending the quasi-war with France—were negotiated, in
one case by the sitting Chief Justice, and in the other by a delegation of which
the sitting Chief Justice was a member.8 Furthermore, questions raised by the
European wars provided the occasion on which the judiciary first determined
that it could not, as an institution, render advisory opinions.9
II. QUIBBLES
As I will note in the next section, I think that Professor Sloss is quite
correct in his observation that the French prize cases provide an important
perspective in considering the role of the federal judiciary in matters touching
on foreign affairs. He makes certain other points, however, on which he places
much less emphasis, and as to which I am uncertain. In the first place,
Professor Sloss calls British “lawfare” a significant hindrance to French
privateering and suggests that cases were brought without regard to their
merit.10 But it is not clear to me that lawfare was as unjustified, as successful,
or as troublesome to France as he argues. As he points out, trial judges in four

4. Id. at 161–64.
5. JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 53 (E.H. Scott ed., 1894).
6. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 14 (1995).
7. See id. at 119.
8. Id. at 89–90, 118–19.
9. Id. at 77–80.
10. See Sloss, supra note 1, at 173–74, 182 (noting that the British “successfully utilized”
lawfare against the French by filing claims in U.S. courts in order to interfere with France’s
military objectives and to prevent the privateers from collecting profits on their prizes, and
suggesting that the fact that the majority of the cases were decided in favor of the privateers
“lends credence to the French allegation that these were frivolous lawsuits”).
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of the eighteen cases he identifies held against the captors.11 That suggests
some basis for the suits. Also, a study of these events indicates that, in the
period prior to the spring of 1795, French privateers based in Charleston, S.C.,
had brought into port thirty-seven English prizes (as well as twenty-nine of
other nationalities), which were sold for something over £66,000—a total
which, of course, does not count prizes taken to other American ports.12 If
privateers were able to realize a sum of this magnitude from the sale of their
prizes, it cannot be true that they were completely hamstrung by the British
legal maneuvers, or that those maneuvers gave as much protection to British
ships as their proponents may have claimed. Further, it should be noted that
the British consul whom Professor Sloss quotes as extolling the effect of
British lawfare13 was involved in the bringing of the suits challenging the
legality of the French captures, and thus had every reason to praise the
consequences of his resort to litigation.14
I have a second quibble regarding Professor Sloss’s observation that these
cases involve judicial recognition of private rights created by international
law.15 He is certainly correct on this point, but to the extent that he seeks to
imply that one could extrapolate from this point to a conclusion regarding the
place of international law in the law of the United States now, it seems to me
that caution is necessary. This follows because Article III expressly extends
“[t]he judicial power [of the United States] . . . to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction.”16 Further, it seems clear that an important reason for
vesting this class of jurisdiction in the federal courts was precisely to ensure
that those courts would be able to hear prize cases.17 However, nothing in
Article III purports to address aspects of customary international law unrelated
to admiralty, and it therefore seems something of a leap to draw very much
about the courts dealing with the former from the fact that they dealt with the
latter.
III. JUDGES AND CASES AFFECTING FOREIGN RELATIONS
The foregoing discussion does not address what I take to be Professor
Sloss’s main claim in the paper: that the United States’ method of dealing with
11. Id. at 182.
12. MELVIN JACKSON, PRIVATEERS IN CHARLESTON 1793–1796, at 122–24 (1969).
13. Sloss, supra note 1, at 174.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 149, 195.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17. CASTO, supra note 6, at 40–41. Indeed, Professor Casto argues that part of the argument
for creating federal courts capable of exercising jurisdiction in prize cases was precisely that more
was at stake in such cases than resolution of disputes about private rights; federal jurisdiction
was, he asserts, thought necessary to ensure that the United States could avoid the national
security problems that would be presented if prize law was not properly applied. Id.
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French prize cases demonstrates that what he calls “the exclusive political
control thesis”—the argument that “the judiciary is barred from participating in
foreign affairs decision making because the Constitution grants the political
branches exclusive control over foreign policy”18—is false.19
To the extent he means to argue that these cases show that the courts are
not forbidden to decide cases having obvious and important effects on foreign
and military affairs, he is clearly correct and is supported by cases decided
long after the quasi-war with France.
The first of these are The Prize Cases20 of 1863. These cases were brought
by persons either owning ships or owning cargo aboard ships which were taken
as prizes by the U.S. Navy in 1861 as having violated the United States’
blockade of the Confederacy.21 The cases were heard together because all
turned on the same basic issue: whether President Lincoln had the authority to
declare a blockade of the Confederacy upon the outbreak of the Civil War in
1861.22 In its decision, the Court did not simply defer to the President; it
examined the facts and concluded that a civil war did in fact exist.23 To be
sure, the opinion states that the President’s proclamation of a blockade was
conclusive as to the existence of a war and the necessity of a blockade,24 but
this statement comes after the Court has been at pains to establish a legal basis
for classifying a civil war as a “war.”25 Further, the Court did not simply
accept the Executive’s determination that the vessels and cargo were properly
subject to capture. It examined the circumstances of each case26 and in fact
held that one of the claimants to part of a ship’s cargo was entitled to have the
cargo restored.27 The question of the authority of the United States to impose a
blockade in these circumstances clearly went to the foundations of the strategy
of the United States in dealing with the Confederacy and with the contacts of
foreign nationals with the Confederacy, but the Court did not simply rubber
stamp the Executive.
A second famous case illustrating these points is Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.28 That well-known case arose from labor difficulties in
the steel industry while the Korean War was taking place.29 President Truman,

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Sloss, supra note 1, at 146.
Id. at 146, 194–96.
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
Id. at 636–38.
See id. at 665–66.
Id. at 666–70.
Id. at 670.
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 666–70.
Id. at 674–82.
Id. at 681–82.
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Id. at 582.
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claiming concern that a steel strike could impede the war effort, purported to
seize the steel mills, that is, to take control of them to maintain production; he
had no statutory basis for doing so.30 Despite the President’s invocation of his
war powers, however, and despite the potential effect on an ongoing foreign
war, the Supreme Court examined the President’s claim of authority and held
that he was without power to carry out the seizure.31
Not only does other precedent support Professor Sloss’s conclusion, then,
but as he points out, the role of the courts during the period he discusses was
modest, at best.32 The decision to declare neutrality was made by the
Executive and enacted into law by Congress; once the precise role the United
States was to play had been decided by the political branches, the courts
simply applied federal statutory law and well-established rules of admiralty
law to the facts they found in individual cases.33 (Indeed, once it became clear
that such questions would continue to arise about violations of American
neutrality by French privateers, this judicial role seems almost inevitable. The
Attorney General was hardly well placed to make such inquiries, and the
United States did not have the option of relying on the Navy to protect its
neutrality—the Navy had no warships.34)
A crucial point, I believe, is that while the cases Professor Sloss addresses
certainly had an impact on the foreign affairs of the United States, they did not
involve judicial determination of foreign policy. Similarly, in The Prize Cases
and Youngstown, the Court determined that the relevant policy had been set out
in the Constitution but, again, did not purport to make policy itself. This
distinction between policy making and the application of policy seems to me to
be what is crucial here.
In this connection, it is helpful to remember the standards enunciated by
Justice Brennan in his discussion of the political question doctrine in Baker v.
Carr:35
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an

30. Id. at 585.
31. Id. at 582–89.
32. Sloss, supra note 1, at 146 (quoting CASTO, supra note 6, at 3).
33. See id. at 155–60.
34. MICHAEL J. CRAWFORD & CHRISTINE F. HUGHES, THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE
NAVY, 1787–1801: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY (1995), available at
http://www.history.navy.mil/biblio/biblio4/biblio4a.htm.
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
36
various departments on one question.

The textual commitment in the Constitution most relevant to the cases
Professor Sloss describes would seem to be Article III’s inclusion of admiralty
cases within the judicial power of the United States. Deciding them depended
on “judicially discoverable and manageable standards”37—policy decisions
made by the President and Congress in proclaiming the neutrality of the United
States and in implementing that proclamation. Since these cases required only
the application of settled rules of law to facts as found by the court, there was
no risk of showing disrespect for the political branches. Nor was there any risk
of different departments of the government taking different positions on the
matter, since the Executive clearly intended to leave the matter to the courts.
One may contrast these prize cases with other cases involving foreign
affairs but where the Court held that it was required to defer to determinations
made by the Executive. These cases involved such subjects as recognition of
governments38 or recognition of a state of belligerency.39 For such matters,
even international law would not provide a court with standards sufficiently
precise to apply as rules of law, and the questions would be ill-suited for
judicial fact-finding. Other cases involved issues concerning which legal rules
could have been applied but were nonetheless resolved by the Court by
deferring to the Executive. For example, even though the Court has taken note
of the fact that international law provided standards for resolving competing
claims to sovereignty over land territory,40 the Supreme Court has held itself
bound by executive determinations regarding sovereignty over territory, both
in situations involving disputes between the United States and another
sovereign41 and in cases where the United States itself has made no claim to
sovereignty.42 These cases, however, reached the Supreme Court after the
Executive, in diplomatic correspondence, had announced to other states its
position on the territorial issues in question, and the Court in both cases
expressly based its holding on the fact that the United States, through the
Executive, had already spoken on the territorial matter.43
In other words, Justice Brennan’s standards for the identification of
political questions clearly have governed in foreign affairs cases in which the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 217.
Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 324 (1937).
See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1863).
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839).
Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 202 (1890).
Williams, 38 U.S. at 420–22.
Id. at 419–20; Jones, 137 U.S. at 202, 212–14, 216–24.
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courts have simply deferred to the Executive. In such cases, either there were
simply no legal standards to apply or, by re-examining the issue, the Court
would have been inserting itself into matters where the policy of the United
States had already been communicated to foreign governments by the
Executive. Even if legal standards existed in this latter group of cases, the
Court by addressing the matter would have risked the difficulties identified by
Justice Harlan in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino:44
The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the
State Department has . . . asserted that the relevant act violated international
law. If the Executive Branch has undertaken negotiations with [a] . . . country,
but has refrained from claims of violation of the law of nations, a
determination to that effect by a court might be regarded as a serious insult,
while a finding of compliance with international law, would greatly strengthen
the bargaining hand of the other state with consequent detriment to American
interests.
Even if the State Department has proclaimed the impropriety of the [other
country’s action], the stamp of approval of its view by a judicial tribunal,
however impartial, might increase any affront and the judicial decision might
occur at a time, almost always well after the taking, when such an impact
would be contrary to our national interest. Considerably more serious and
far-reaching consequences would flow from a judicial finding that
international law standards had been met if that determination flew in the face
of a State Department proclamation to the contrary. When articulating
principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive
Branch speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional
rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of standards it believes
desirable for the community of nations and protective of national concerns. In
short, whatever way the matter is cut, the possibility of conflict between the
45
Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided.

We see then that the Court has distinguished between cases involving
application of policy in a foreign affairs matter and those involving the making
of foreign policy. The former include matters such as those described by
Professor Sloss, where there were not only legal standards available to decide
the cases, but the language of Article III itself made clear that the controversies
were to be resolved by the judiciary. The latter include cases where there were
no legal standards to apply or where, even given such standards, the interests
of specific foreign states were involved, and the Court could not act without
risking contradicting the position taken by the Executive in its dealings with
those states. This distinction helps to explain the error in Justice Thomas’s

44. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
45. Id. at 432–33.
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opinion in the Hamdi case,46 to which Professor Sloss makes reference.47
Hamdi was a case in which an American citizen, captured in Afghanistan by
groups allied with the United States and subsequently surrendered to and
detained by the United States, sought release from detention.48 The Court held
that Hamdi was entitled to challenge his confinement in habeas proceedings;
that in those proceedings the Government was obliged to put forward evidence,
which would be disclosed to Hamdi, establishing that Hamdi was, in fact, an
“enemy combatant”;49 and that Hamdi was entitled to an opportunity to rebut
the Government’s showing.50
Justice Thomas dissented from this conclusion, arguing that the detention
fell “squarely within the Federal Government’s war powers, and [the Court
lacked] the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”51 He based
this conclusion on the importance to the country of the protection of national
security and the President’s primary responsibility in that regard, and on the
courts’ lack of the information and expertise that would permit them to
question the President’s judgment in national security matters.52 He further
asserted that, “the decision whether someone is an enemy combatant is, no
doubt, ‘delicate, complex, and involv[es] large elements of prophecy.’”53 He
suggested that this complexity explained the fact that the Government had not
provided the courts with the full criteria it used to classify individuals as
enemy combatants.54
Justice Thomas sought to bolster his argument through references to
several cases. Two are of particular importance. He cited Ex parte Quirin55
for the proposition that the Court in that case was “not . . . concerned with any
question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.”56 He also quoted
language from Moyer v. Peabody,57 a suit under what is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983
brought by the president of a labor organization against a former governor of

46. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Sloss, supra note 1, at 146.
48. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–11 (plurality opinion).
49. For purposes of deciding the case, the Court’s plurality defined the term “enemy
combatant” to mean at least someone who “was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States there.” Id. at 516 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 533–34.
51. Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 580–83.
53. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
54. Id.
55. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
56. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25).
57. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
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Colorado.58 The labor leader had been imprisoned for seventy-eight days in
the course of the suppression of what the governor had proclaimed to be an
insurrection;59 the labor leader had not been charged or brought before a judge
during that period, and he had been released when the state government had
determined that the insurrection had been suppressed.60 It was conceded,
apparently, that the governor’s determination of the existence of an
insurrection could not be challenged, and that the arrest had been made in good
faith as part of the effort to suppress the disorder.61 The court held that a
damage suit would not lie if good faith was assumed, in light of the necessity
that the governor, as the man on the spot, deal with the immediate problem.62
Finally, Justice Thomas sought to distinguish Ex parte Endo.63 That case
held that a concededly loyal, law-abiding American citizen of Japanese descent
could not be confined under the regulations imposed on those persons of
Japanese ancestry held in camps after their removal from the West Coast.64
The Court observed that the executive order that provided the legal basis for
the removal of Japanese-descended persons spoke only of removal; it did not
explicitly authorize detention.65 Further, the Court noted the order justified the
measures it established as intending to prevent espionage and sabotage.66
Since a person conceded to be loyal necessarily posed no threat of espionage or
sabotage, the Court held that it could not read an order—which did not even
explicitly authorize detention—as a basis for detention in such a case.67
According to Justice Thomas, Endo was distinguishable because the
Government in that case sought to justify the detention on the basis of reasons
unrelated to the rationales set out in controlling legal instruments.68
The errors in Justice Thomas’s analysis help to underline the argument
Professor Sloss has made. Preliminarily, the authority Justice Thomas cited in
support of his argument in fact does not support it. As Justice Scalia observed
in his dissent in Hamdi, the Court could ignore questions of the defendants’
status in Quirin because there was no dispute as to their status; they were
admitted to be German agents.69 However, as Justice Scalia further noted, the

58. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Moyer, 212 U.S. at 84).
59. Moyer, 212 U.S. at 82.
60. Id. at 82–83.
61. See id. at 82–84.
62. Id. at 84–85.
63. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944)).
64. Endo, 323 U.S. at 294–95, 297–301.
65. Id. at 300–01.
66. Id. at 297.
67. Id. at 297–302.
68. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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issue in Hamdi was precisely that the detainee denied that he was an enemy
combatant and sought to require the Government to at least permit him to
refute the allegation—a situation very different from that in Quirin.70 Justice
Scalia also showed that Moyer was distinguishable, involving as it did a suit
for damages rather than a challenge to the confinement itself, and a relatively
limited period of confinement71 as opposed to the indefinite confinement
Hamdi faced. He might have added that the Court in Moyer also suggested
that the result in that case might have been different if the labor leader had
been detained longer.72 Further, Justice Thomas’s attempt to distinguish Endo
does not really work. The difficulty is that the Government was represented
before the Court by the Solictor General;73 surely that indicates that the
Executive had determined that the petitioner’s continued detention was
necessary to the war effort, whatever the language of the executive orders on
which the Government’s actions were based. And it was exactly that executive
determination that the Endo court rejected.
Justice Thomas is thus left with the argument that determining whether a
person is an enemy combatant is somehow beyond judicial competence. Yet
he never explains why that should be so. He states “the decision whether
someone is an enemy combatant is, no doubt, ‘delicate, complex, and
involv[es] large elements of prophecy.’”74 One could argue just as plausibly
that that decision would have to be one that could be made on the basis of clear
and explicit criteria, since it would have to be made by relatively low-ranking
persons on the battlefield, and such persons would presumably require some
sort of definite guidance from these criteria. In any case, however, since the
Government refused to inform the Court as to the criteria it employed,75 it is
very unclear how Justice Thomas or anyone else could determine the ability of
judges to apply those criteria.
Certainly, the cases Professor Sloss discusses show the Court’s ability to
address matters involving the use of force. Among those cases were some
requiring courts to decide whether a French privateer had increased its fighting
strength while in an American port76 and the role played by each of two
different alleged privateering vessels in the capture of a particular prize.77 It is
not obvious why resolving such questions is inherently more judicial, or less

70. Id. at 571–72.
71. Id. at 572 n.4.
72. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
73. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 285 (1944).
74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Chi. & S.
Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
75. Id. at 516 (plurality opinion).
76. See Moodie v. The Betty Cathcart, 17 F. Cas. 651 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 9742).
77. See Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
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difficult, than determining whether a particular individual meets the criteria
defining an enemy combatant.
In short, Justice Thomas’s argument for judicial incapacity in foreign
relations matters cannot be sustained in the face of the implications of the cases
Professor Sloss has described.
CONCLUSION
The cases Professor Sloss has described render untenable any argument
that cases affecting foreign relations are somehow off limits to the federal
courts. To be sure, cases requiring judges to, in effect, establish foreign policy
may well not be appropriate for judicial resolution, but such cases form only a
part of all those that could be said to affect foreign relations. In particular, it
would appear to be a quintessentially judicial task to decide cases requiring
nothing more than resolving factual disputes on the basis of evidence and
applying clear rules of decision to the facts so found. If these conclusions fail
to determine the answers to all questions raised when matters affecting foreign
policy come before the courts, they at least show the mistakes of those who
would simply bar the courthouse door to such cases.
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